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I. INTRODUCTION

While certain provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012' (NDAA 2012) have caused some controversy, 2
the more than 500 page bill has numerous national defense provisions
which both Democrat and Republican leaders considered necessary.3
One particular section of the NDAA 2012 that received strong
*

J.D. May 2013, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S., University of
Florida, 2010. 1 would like to thank my family for their tremendous support.
1. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125
Stat. 1298 (2012) [hereinafter NDAA 2012].
2. See Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 978 (Dec. 31, 2012) (expressing the Obama
Administration's reservations with certain provisions of the NDAA 2012 related to the
detention, interrogation, and prosecution of suspected terrorists).
3. See id. (recognizing the NDAA 2012's importance in modernizing the national
defense and boosting the effectiveness of military operations worldwide); 157 CONG. REC.
S7643-48 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2011) (statements of Sen. Carl Levin and Sen. John McCain)
(introducing amendment 1092 to the NDAA 2012 and noting the strong bipartisan support of
section 818).
329
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bipartisan support during the drafting and passage of the bill addressed
the growing concern with counterfeit electronic parts4 entering the
defense supply chain. In multiple instances prior to the passage of
NDAA 2012, the Department of Defense (DoD) discovered thousands
of unique parts and materials that contained counterfeit electronic parts
provided by hundreds of suppliers. 6 Therefore, Congress added section
818 to the NDAA 2012 to address problems related to the detection and
avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts throughout the defense supply
chain.7 Section 818 authorized the Secretary of Defense to create
acquisition policies and systems for the detection and avoidance of
counterfeit electronic parts and established criminal penalties for the use
of counterfeit electronic parts.8
Congress codified the criminal offenses for trafficking in counterfeit
military goods or services under section 2320 of title 18, U.S. Code.9
Similar criminal offenses for trafficking in counterfeit goods under
section 2320 are based on trademark principles established by the
Lanham Act,1 o and the NDAA 2012's revisions to section 2320 draw
from these principles as well." And while at the time of this writing the
Secretary of Defense has yet to amend DoD acquisition policies and
systems for the detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts,12
4. Section 818 defines an "electronic part" as "an integrated circuit, a discrete electronic
component (including, but not limited to, a transistor, resistor, or diode,) or a circuit assembly."
NDAA 2012, § 818(f)(2).
5. Id. § 818, 25 Stat. at 1493-1500. See also 157 CONG. REc. S7647 (daily ed. Nov. 17,
2011) (statement of Sen. John McCain) (regarding amendment 1092 to the NDAA 2012).
6. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 and the Future Years
Defense Program:Hearingon S. 1253 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 112th Cong. 22829 (2011) (statement of Patrick J. O'Reilly, Lieutenant General, USA). The large number of
counterfeit parts throughout the defense supply chain required numerous recalls. Id.
7. NDAA 2012, § 818, 125 Stat. at 1493-1500.
8. Id. § 818(a)-(e), (h), 125 Stat. at 1493-96, 1497-1500.
9. Id. § 818(h), 125 Stat. at 1497-1500.
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2006).
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d), (f)(3) (2012) (defining the Lanham Act and those charged
with violations of section 2320 to assert any defenses that would be available under the Lanham
Act).
12. While the official definition has not been promulgated at the time of this writing, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued memoranda
detailing internal expectations regarding the detection and avoidance of counterfeit items,
including definitions of "counterfeit material" and "suspect parts." See Memorandum from
Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Tech. and Logistics Frank Kendall to Sec'ys.
of the Military Dep'ts. and Dirs. of the Def. Agencies, Overarching DoD Counterfeit Prevention
Guidance (Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://www.dmsms2012.com/images/CounterfeitPrevention-Guidance.pdf (defining "counterfeit material"); Memorandum from Acting
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Tech. and Logistics Frank Kendall, DoD Supply
Chain Material Management Policy (Dec. 14, 2011), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdfl414001 p.pdf (defining "counterfeit material" and "suspect part"). Although
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the Lanham Act will certainly be considered in drafting and
promulgating those regulations.' 3
But despite Congress's intent of promoting safety throughout the
defense supply chain by passing section 818 through the promulgation
of counterfeit prevention regulations and the increased criminal
penalties of section 2320,14 the DoD faces various problems in
effectively implementing section 818. Those throughout the defense
contracting industry have criticized the rule-making process thus far,
noting the lack of formal or public process to solicit comments related
to the development of the rules required by section 818.'1 Industry
organizations have already endorsed proposed amendments to section
818 contained in the NDAA 2013 reducin 6the costs imposed to
contractors who comply with regulations.
In addition to the
opposition, certain trademark principles codified in the Lanham Act
may create some unintended outcomes that may hamper the fight
against counterfeit electronic parts in the defense supply chain.
This Note addresses the potential conflicts between Congress's
intent in eliminating counterfeit electronic parts from the defense supply
chain and the use of criminal penalties that rely upon the Lanham Act's
trademark principles to achieve these ends. Following the introduction,
Part II discusses the defense supply chain and the pervasiveness of
counterfeit electronic parts throughout it. Part III analyzes section 2320
in the context of related Lanham Act principles, along with relevant
case law applying to government contractors trafficking in counterfeit
goods. Part IV provides suggestions for implementing the section 818
regulations and introduces alternative theories of liability that could
not explicitly stated, these memoranda may been an attempt to fulfill the DoD's requirement
under NDAA 2012 section 818(b)(1) to "establish Department-wide definitions of the terms
'counterfeit electronic part' and 'suspect counterfeit electronic part."' NDAA 2012 § 818(b)(1),
125 Stat. at 1493-94.
13. Id. § 818(g), 125 Stat. at 1496-97.
14. See 157 CONG. REC. S7643-48 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2011) (statements of Sen. Carl
Levin and Sen. John McCain) (stating that amendment 1092 to the NDAA 2012 will address the
problem that counterfeit electronic parts entering the defense supply chain present to the safety
and security of armed service members).
15. Robert S. Metzger, Counterfeit Parts: What to Do Before the Regulations (and
Regulators) Come? Practical Steps Industry Can Take Now, 98 FED. CONTRACTS REPORTER

246, 1 (2012). The DoD has already delayed the promulgation of these regulations past the due
date set by Congress, so it may be unclear whether the DoD will forego a comment period on
these regulations. See NDAA 2012 § 818(b), 125 Stat. at 1493-94 (requiring promulgation of
contractor regulations within 270 days of the passage of section 818, September 26, 2012);
DEP'T OF DEF., OPEN DFARS CASES 3 (Oct. 26, 2012), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/

dpap/dars/opencases/dfarscasenum/dfars.pdf (stating that in case number 2012-DO55, at the time
of this writing, that October 31, 2012 was the extended report date for a draft proposed rule of
section 818 requirements).
16. Metzger, supra note 15, at 6-7.
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better serve Congress's intent of eliminating counterfeit electronic parts
in the defense supply chain.
II. COUNTERFEIT PARTS IN THE DEFENSE SUPPLY CHAIN

Every year the U.S. Government invests substantial energy and
resources into each branch of the armed services and an effective supply
chain is an integral part in the military's ability to operate efficiently
and execute its global operations. 17 As with most consumer goods, the
U.S. Government has a vital interest in protecting the military from
using unsafe military weapons.' 8 Part A of this Part will describe the
defense supply chain and the growth of counterfeit electronic parts
found within it. Part B of this Part details previous efforts of detecting
counterfeit goods in the United States and compares past efforts with
section 818's goal of eliminating counterfeit electronic parts from the
defense supply chain.
A. The Defense Supply Chain
In order to understand the section 818's goals of eliminating
counterfeit electronic parts from the defense supply chain it is important
to understand how the defense supply chain operates. Various
government agencies provide support for the U.S. Military, and these
agencies can focus their efforts on providing a specific type of military
supplies or supplying a specific branch of the military.' 9 But regardless
each agency's focus, the procurement, storage and distribution of
electronic parts are integral responsibilities for operation of a safe and
effective defense supply chain.
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is an agency of the DoD and
serves as one of the most far-reaching agencies in supporting the U.S.
Military.20 DLA provides the U.S. Military with nearly 100% of its
medical supplies and 84% of its spare parts.21 Additionally, DLA
17.

See generally DLA

at a

Glance, DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY

(Oct. 29, 2012),

http://www.dla.mil/Pages/ataglance.aspx.
18. 157 CONG. REc. S8649-50 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2011) (statement of Sen. Sheldon
Whitehouse) (remarking that the proliferation of counterfeit electronic parts throughout the
defense supply chain poses a growing safety threat).
19. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency provides specific services for all
branches of the military. DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY, supra note 17. Conversely, the Naval Supply
Systems Command provides supply chain management services only to the U.S. Navy. Navy
Supply Chain Management, NAVY SUPPLY SYS. COMMAND (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.navsup.

navy.mil/navsup/capabilities/nscm [hereinafter Navy Supply ChainManagement].
20.

DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY, supra note 17.

2 1. Id.
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manages the reuse of military equipment across all branches of the
armed services.22 The DLA uses 8 separate supply chains that manage
over 5 million items to support 2100 weapons systems, acting with the
size and scope of major commercial companies that provide consumer
goods to the general public.23 Conversely, the Naval Supply System
Command (NAVSUP) serves a different military audience than DLA
but provides many of the same services to a specific branch of the
armed services, the U.S. Navy.24 In managing the Navy's supply chain,
NAVSUP supports the Navy's fleets by projecting procurement
requirements, allocating materials, managing repairs, overseeing the
lifecycle of military equipment, and ensuring the reliability of military
equipment. 2 5
These agencies and others like them show the breadth of capabilities
required to support the U.S. Military. But despite spending vast
resources to manage the defense supply chain, agencies like DLA and
NAVSUP must turn to the private sector to manufacture the goods they
supply to the military.2 To do this, an "original component
manufacturer" (OCM) provides parts to not only DoD agencies, but also
authorized and independent parts distributors who sell these parts to the
DoD, prime contractors, subcontractors, and circuit board assemblers
(collectively, "defense contractors").2 7 After incorporating parts from
numerous OCMs into their own products, the defense contractors
eventually avail their products to DoD procurement.2 8 This public and
private partnership, however, allows counterfeit electronic parts to enter
the defense supply chain, with each level of defense contractors
presenting additional risks.2 9
The worldwide production of counterfeit electronic parts has grown
significantly since 2005, and the defense supply chain has felt this
effect. 30 It is suspected that most of these counterfeits originated in
22. Id. Specifically, DLA operates in 48 countries and manages 26 distribution depots
worldwide so that it can efficiently allocate resources to the regions of the world with higher
demand for specific supplies. Id.
23. In 2011, DLA's sales and revenue of $46.1 billion is greater than 90% of Fortune 500
companies. Id. DLA has over 27,000 employees who process over 100,000 requisitions and
11,000 contract actions per day. Id.
24. See Navy Supply ChainManagement, supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Contracting Services, NAVY SUPPLY SYs. COMMAND (Oct. 29, 2012),
https://www.navsup.navy.mil/navsup/capabilities/contractingservice
(awarding billions in
annual contracts to private suppliers for the procurement of items such as the Navy's
information technology).
27. See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
ASSESSMENT: COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONICS 4 (2010).

2 8. Id.
29. See id. at 3-4.
30. Id. at 170; see also id. at 141-64 (highlighting the specific instances of counterfeit
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Asia, with more than one-third coming from China. 3 1 Additionally,
various sources, from large corporations to individual persons, are
placing these counterfeits into the defense supply chain. 32 These
findings prompted both Congress and defense contractors to promulgate
regulations and industry standards to fight against the proliferation of
counterfeit electronic parts. 33
B. Efforts to Eliminate CounterfeitElectronic Parts
Prior to the passage of NDAA 2012, criminal counterfeit penalties
addressed trafficking of counterfeit goods and services in general.3 4 The
private sector has also created industry standards for the detection of
counterfeit electronic parts. 35 While the NDAA 2012 created criminal
penalties that specifically address the trafficking of counterfeit
electronic parts in scope more narrow than previous efforts, 36 it
harmonizes the efforts of Congress and the private sector in promoting
safety throughout the defense supply chain. This Part will detail the
evolution of those efforts leading up to the NDAA 2012's expansion of
criminal liability for trafficking in counterfeit military goods or
services.
Congress first codified criminal penalties for trafficking in
counterfeit goods by passing the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of
1984.38 The Act established criminal liability for "[w]hoever
intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services and
knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods
electronic parts discovered in defense supply chain inventory).
31. Id. at 177.
32. See Bruce Rayner, Chip Counterfeiting Case Exposes Defense Supply Chain Flaw,
ELEC. ENG'G TIMES (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4229964/Chip(detailing charges against large
counterfeiting-case-exposes-defense-supply-chain-flaw
company that knowingly sold counterfeit electronic parts); see also Thomas Claburn, Saudi
Citizen Selling Fake Cisco Gear Sentenced, INFO. WEEK (May 7, 2010), http://www.information
week.com/news/security/vulnerabilities/224701177 (detailing the conviction of an individual
who trafficked counterfeit electronic parts).
33. See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 27, at 192. SAE
AEROSPACE, SAE INT'L, SAE STANDARD AS5563, COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONIC PARTS;

AVOIDANCE, DETECTION, MITIGATION, AND DISPOSITION (2009) (establishing standards for the
avoidance, detection, mitigation and disposition of counterfeit electronic parts in the aerospace
industry).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006).
35. See generally SAE AEROSPACE, SAE INT'L, supra note 33, at 1.
36. But see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Prioritizing Resources & Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008,
Pub. L, No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4261 (amending the most recent version of section 2320 prior to
the passage of NDAA 2012, does not contain reference to any specific counterfeit good or
service in which trafficking is prohibited or punished differently).
38. NDAA 2012, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1502(a), 98 Stat. 2178, 2178 (1984).
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or services." 39 The Act also provided that "[a]ll defenses, affirmative
defenses, and limitations on remedies that would be applicable in an
action under the Lanham Act .

.

. shall be applicable in a Jrosecution

under [section 2320 of Title 18, United States Code]." The only
substantive amendments to section 2320 prior 4 1 to the NDAA 2012
prohibited the trafficking of trademarked labels 42 and the transshipment
or exportation of counterfeit goods, services, or labels.43 The White
House advocated for an increase in those penalties, 44 and Congress
echoed these concerns by expanding the penalties relating to the
trafficking in counterfeit goods in section 2320.45
The private sector has taken a different approach in addressing the
volume of counterfeit electronic parts in various supply chains. For
example, the International Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), a
professional organization that develops industry standards and best
practices for the aerospace, automotive, and commercial-vehicles
industries, proactively encourages the elimination of counterfeit
electronic parts.4 6 By providing uniform requirements, practices, and
methods, SAE has been able to mitigate the performance, reliability,
and safety risks associated with receiving and installing counterfeit
electronic parts that have entered the aerospace supply chain.4 7 These
standards accomplish this by requiring companies to implement internal
controls that address parts availability, purchasing processes, supply
chain traceability, procurement contract requirements, product
assurances, material controls, and reporting requirements.4 8 These
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Afler the NDAA 2012 amended section 2320 to create specific penalties for
trafficking in counterfeit military goods and services, Congress also created specific criminal
penalties for trafficking in counterfeit drugs. See Food and Drug Administration Safety and
Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 717, 126 Stat. 993, 1076-77 (2012).
42. Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 109-181,
§§ 1(b), 2(b), 120 Stat. 285, 288 (2006). (prohibiting the trafficking of "labels, patches, stickers,
wrappers, badges, emblems, medallions, charms, boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags,
documentation, or packaging of any type or nature, knowing that a counterfeit mark has been
applied thereto, the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive").
43. Prioritizing Resources & Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-403, § 205, 122 Stat. 4261 ("No goods or services, the trafficking in of which is
prohibited by this section, shall be transshipped through or exported from the United States.").
44.

See ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMIN.'s WHITE PAPER ON INTELLECTUAL PROP.

ENFORCEMENT LEG. RECOMMENDATIONS (2011) (advocating for the increase in sentences and

fines for convictions of trafficking in various counterfeit goods).
45. See Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 32014(a), 108 Stat. 2148 (2008).
46. About SAE, SAE INT'L (May 20, 2012), http://www.sae.org/about/.
47.

See SAE AEROSPACE, SAE INT'L, supra note 33, at 1.

48. See generally id. at 2 (listing appendices that detail specific business divisions within
companies that need significant oversight regarding counterfeit electronic parts).
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internal controls aid defense contractors by detecting counterfeits,
determining with which suppliers they should engage in business,
proving conformity with buyers' specifications, and assigning liability
when faced with the presence of counterfeits.4 9
In order to achieve uniformity throughout the aerospace industry
when confronted with a suspect part, the SAE Aerospace Standards
also provide standard definitions. SAE defines a "counterfeit part" as
"[a] suspect part that is a copy or substitute without legal right or
authority to do so or one whose material, performance, or characteristics
are knowingly misrepresented by a supplier in the supply chain."
SAE's counterfeit part definition, influenced by SAE's goal in
promoting performance, reliability, and safety in parts contained
throughout the aerospace supply chain, focuses on the quality of the
item itself.52 While this definition may be suitable for the aerospace
industry, it differs from the Lanham Act's definition of a "counterfeit" 53
and the section 2320's definition of a "counterfeit mark," 54 which focus
49. See id.
50. A "suspect part" is "[a] part in which there is an indication by visual inspection,
testing, or other information that it may have been misrepresented by the supplier or
manufacturer and may meet the definition of counterfeit part .... ." Id. at 5.
51. Id The Standards also provide examples of counterfeit parts, which include but are
not limited to:
a) parts which do not contain the proper internal construction (die,
manufacturer, wire bonding, etc.) consistent with the ordered part; b) parts
which have been used, refurbished or reclaimed, but represented as new
product; c) parts which have different package style or surface plating/finish
than the ordered parts; d) parts which have not successfully completed the
Original Component Manufacturer's (OCM)'s full production and test flow, but
are represented as completed product; e) parts sold as upscreened parts, which
have not successfully completed upscreening; f) parts sold with modified
labeling or markings intended to misrepresent the part's form, fit, function, or
grade.
Id. Parts are not considered counterfeit if they have been refinished, upscreened, or uprated and
have been identified as such. Id.
52. See id at 1.
53. A "counterfeit" is "a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially
indistinguishable from, a register mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
54. A "counterfeit mark" is
a spurious mark-(i) that is used in connection with trafficking in any goods,
services, labels, patches, stickers, wrappers, badges, emblems, medallions,
charms, boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags, documentation, or packaging
of any type or nature; (ii) that is identical with, or substantially
indistinguishable from, a mark registered on the principal register in the United
States Patent and Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant
knew such mark was so registered; (iii) that is applied to or used in connection

2012]1

COUNTERFEITELECTRONIC PARTS AND THE LANHAMACT

337

on the registered trademark instead of the quality of the underlying
product. This differentiation could pose difficulties when attempting to
enforce the increased penalties for trafficking in counterfeit military
goods or services.
In attempting to prevent counterfeit electronic parts from entering
the defense supply chain, Congress amended section 2320 to establish
criminal liability for those who traffic in counterfeit military goods or
services. 6 Those convicted of trafficking in a specific class of
counterfeit military goods or services are now subject to increased fines
and penalties compared to the trafficking of other counterfeit goods,
services or labels. In distinguishing this specific class of penalties,
section 2320 now defines a "counterfeit military good or service,"
which combines the use of a counterfeit mark with good or service that
does not meet military specifications or is intended for use in a military

with the goods or services for which the mark is registered with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, or is applied to or consists of a label,
patch, sticker, wrapper, badge, emblem, medallion, charm, box, container, can,
case, hangtag, documentation, or packaging of any type or nature that is
designed, marketed, or otherwise intended to be used on or in connection with
the goods or services for which the mark is registered in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office; and (iv) the use of which is likely to cause
confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (B) a spurious designation that is
identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a designation as to which
the remedies of the Lanham Act are made available by reason of section
220506 of title 36.
i8 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(1) (2012).
55. See 157 CONG. REC. S7643 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2011) (statement of and Sen. John
McCain) (stating that the bill "will address a critically important issue we have now seen in the
defense supply system with millions of counterfeit parts . .. getting into our defense system and
threatening the security of our troops, the effectiveness of their mission, and costing the
taxpayers a heck of a lot of money").
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(3):
Whoever intentionally traffics in goods or services knowing that such good or
service is a counterfeit military good or service . . . the use, malfunction, or
failure of which is likely to cause serious bodily injury or death, the disclosure
of classified information of combat operations, or other significant harm to a
combat operation ... a member of the Armed Forces, or to national security, or
attempts or conspires to violate . . this subsection to criminal penalties.
57. Id. Penalties generally consisted of fines no greater than $2,000,000 and
imprisonment not more than ten years for an individual and no more than $5,000,000 for those
other than an individual. Id. § 2320(a)(1). The NDAA 2012 increased penalties for the specific
trafficking of counterfeit military goods or services to fines not more than $5,000,000 and
imprisonment not more than twenty years for individuals and fines no greater than $15,000,000
for those other than individuals. Id. § 2320(b)(3).
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or national security application. Section 2320 still allows defendants
subject to criminal prosecution for the trafficking in counterfeit military
goods or services to assert Lanham Act defenses, affirmative defenses,
and limitations on remedies.5 9
As opposed to the reactive nature of criminal penalties, the
remainder of section 818 attempts to proactively prevent counterfeit
electronic parts from entering the defense supply chain. 60 To address the
detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts, the NDAA 2012
requires the Secretary of Defense to implement internal controls with
the DoD and to revise the DoD Supplement to the Federal Acquisition
Regulations related to the procurement of counterfeit electronic parts.61
The internal controls will define the terms "counterfeit electronic part"
and "suspect counterfeit electronic part;" 62 require personnel training
regarding counterfeit electronic parts; implement procedures for the
inspecting, testing, reporting and quarantining of counterfeit electronic
parts; and create guidelines and remedial actions for suppliers who fail
to detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts.63 The revisions to the
Federal Acquisition Regulations will assign the responsibility of
detecting and avoiding counterfeit electronic parts to defense
contractors; require that all defense contractors obtain electronic parts
only from original manufacturers, trusted suppliers, 64 and authorized
dealers; and establish procedures for contractors to report the detection
58. Id. § 2320(e)(4):
(4) The term 'counterfeit military good or service' means a good or service that
uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such good or service and
that-(A) is falsely identified or labeled as meeting military specifications, or
(B) is intended for use in a military or national security application.
59. Id. § 2320(d).
60. 157 CONG. REC. S7647-48 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2011) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin)
(describing the reasons for which proactive measures are needed to prevent counterfeit
electronic parts from entering the defense supply chain).
61. NDAA 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 818(b)-(c), 125 Stat. 1298, 1493-96 (2012).
These actions will be based on an internal assessment of the DoD's current acquisition policies
and systems. Id. § 818(a), 125 Stat. at 1493.
62. The DoD gave a preliminary indication of how counterfeit material would be defined
in these preventions programs. See Kendall, Overarching DoD Counterfeit Prevention
Guidance, supra note 12, at I (defining "counterfeit material" as "an item that is an
unauthorized copy or substitute that has been identified, marked and/or altered by a source other
than the item's legally authorized source and has been misrepresented to be an authorized item
of the legally authorized source" and suggesting that "a used item represented as a new item
may also be subject to fraudulent representation procedures").
63. NDAA 2012, § 818(b), 125 Stat. at 1493-94.
64. Id. § 818(c)(3), 125 Stat. at 1495 (creating a trusted supplier program to reduce the
risk of unsafe electronic parts from reaching contractors further down the supply chain).
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of counterfeit electronic parts.6 5 Additionally, the Secretary of Defense
will establish training programs to assist contractors with their new
responsibilities pertaining to the detection and avoidance of counterfeit
electronic parts. 6 And since a majority of these counterfeit electronic
parts enter the defense supply chain from oversees, 67 the Department of
Homeland Security will also establish procedures for inspecting
electronic parts imported from other countries.
Congress defined the amendment's scope as applying to "electronic
parts," which are defined in section 818 as "an integrated circuit, a
discrete electronic component (including, but not limited to, a transistor,
capacitor, resistor, or diode), or a circuit assembly." 69 This is one of the
various definitions related to counterfeit electronic parts and counterfeit
military goods or services contained in section 818 or section 2320, all
of which refer to different regulations or codes that Congress has
enacted to promote safety and reduce risk associated with the defense
supply chain. 7 0 However, the inconsistent use of terms throughout both
public and private prevention measures and criminal penalties7 ' will
cause confusion and difficulty for the DoD in implementing, and
defense contractors in adhering to, the section 818 regulations, which
could interfere with Congress's goal of creating a safe defense supply
chain. 72
There are two ways to approach the solution for counterfeit
electronic parts-creating liability for the improper use of the registered
trademark itself, or for failing to produce the electronic part with
65.
66.

Id. § 818(c), 125 Stat. at 1494-96.
See id. § 818(e), 125 Stat. at 1496.

67.

See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 27, at 170.

68. NDAA 2012, § 818(d), 125 Stat. at 1496.
69. Id. § 818(g)(2), 125 Stat. at 1496-97.
70. See 157 CONG. REC. S7647-48 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2011) (statement of Sen. Carl
Levin) (describing the reasons for which proactive measures are needed to prevent counterfeit
electronic parts from entering the defense supply chain).
71. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining "counterfeit"); id § 1116(d)(1)(B)
(defining "counterfeit mark"); 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(1) (defining "counterfeit mark"); id §
2320(f)(4) (defining "counterfeit military good or service"); NDAA 2012, § 818(f)(2), 125 Stat.
at 1298 (defining "electronic part"); id. § 818(b)(1) (requiring the Secretary to establish
definitions of "counterfeit electronic part" and "suspect counterfeit electronic part"); Kendall,
Overarching DoD Counterfeit Prevention Guidance, supra note 12, at 1; Kendall, DoD Supply
Chain Material Management Policy, supra note 12, at 16-19 (defining "counterfeit material"
and "suspect counterfeit"); SAE AEROSPACE, SAE INT'L, supra note 33, at 5 (defining
"counterfeit part" and "suspect part"); S. COMM. ON ARMED SERV., INQUIRY INTO COUNTERFEIT
ELEC. PARTS IN THE DEP'T OF DEF. SUPPLY CHAIN, S. REP. No. 112-167, at 36-37 (2012)

(defining "counterfeit").
72. See Metzger, supranote 15, at 3 (suggesting that the confusion over the "counterfeit"
definition could draw controversy when interpreting the section 818 regulations, thus
encouraging contractors to implement overly stringent testing and inspection procedures).
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sufficient standards of quality. In order to best prevent counterfeit
electronic parts from entering the defense supply chain, the Secretary of
Defense should narrowly focus on the quality of the good. The Lanham
Act's trademark principles are not the best means to assure the uniform
compliance in accomplishing Congress's goals in enacting section 818.
III. LANHAM ACT APPLICATION TO COUNTERFEIT MARKS

The nature of the defense supply chain presents distinct issues
compared to other typical counterfeit cases. The various levels of
defense contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers involved with DoD
procurement each present an additional opportunity for counterfeit
electronic parts to enter the defense supply chain.73 While the inclusion
of proactive detection programs in the section 818 highlight the
importance of removing counterfeits electronic parts before they enter
the final product, it will be difficult to hold the producers of these
counterfeits accountable because so many are located oversees.74
Despite section 2320's increased penalties, the statute's reliance on the
Lanham Act does not provide adequate reactive measures for achieving
Congress and the White House's goal of punishing those who allow
counterfeit electronic parts to enter the defense supply chain. This Part
will discuss the Lanham Act's impact on Congress's goal of making a
safer defense supply chain.
The Lanham Act's prohibition against the use of counterfeit marks
provides a civil cause of action to owners of registered trademarks
against any person who uses in commerce a reproduction or copy of the
registrant's mark "in connection with the sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive."7 6 The remedies available to the registrant, however, are
limited to an injunction when the infringer's acts are committed without
"knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."7 The knowledge
requirement is similar to section 2320 because the offense requires the
intent to traffic in counterfeit military goods or services.7 8 Section 2320
also provides various affirmative defenses which are based on the
73.

See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 27, at 3-4.

74. See id.
75. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a).
77. Id. § 1114(1). If the infringer acted with knowledge, the registrant can recover profits
or damages. Id.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(3) (2012).
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defenses available to infringers of the Lanham Act. 79 However, these
sections differ due to the various "counterfeit" definitions contained
throughout both sections, especially in regard to counterfeit military
goods or services.
The Lanham Act defines a "counterfeit" as a "spurious mark which
is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered
mark."80 This definition is one of four requirements for a "counterfeit
mark" to be considered a "spurious mark" under section 2320; the mark
must also be used in connection with trafficking in any goods or
services and applied to or used in connection with the goods or services
for which the mark is registered, and the use of the mark must also be
likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive. 8 However,
the Lanham Act's definition of a "counterfeit mark" differs from section
2320.82 Section 2320's additional requirement for a "counterfeit military
good or service" requires that the "counterfeit mark," "be used on or in
connection with such good or service that is falsely identified as
meeting military specifications, or is intended for use in a military or
national security application."83 The elements of the criminal offense
require that the defendant have intentionally used a counterfeit mark in
connection with the goods or services, 84 but this statute has yet to be
analyzed with regard to counterfeit military goods or services.
Section 2320's knowledge requirement related to the use of a
"counterfeit mark" has been extended beyond the use of spurious marks.
In United States v. Petrosian, the Ninth Circuit held that section 2320
applied to the defendant's resale of genuine Coca-Cola bottles which
defendant refilled with a cola-like carbonated beverage that defendant
knew was not Coca-Cola.86 The court reasoned that "[w]hen a genuine
trademark is affixed to a counterfeit product, it becomes a spurious
mark" since "[a] 'spurious' mark is one that is false or inauthentic."87
Under this analysis, the court expands the definition of "counterfeit
79.
80.

Id. § 2320(d).
15 U.S.C. § 1127.

81.

18 U.S.C. § 2320(t)(1).

82.

15 U.S.C.

§ 11 16(d)(1)(B)(i):

[A] counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or services sold,
offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use, whether or not the person
against whom relief is sought knew such mark was so registered.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(4).
See United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1986).
126 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1234.
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mark" under section 2320 to include genuine marks attached to inferior
products. The court relies on the Lanham Act's "counterfeit mark"
definition in its analysis, along with other cases in which courts have
held "defendants civilly liable under the Lanham Act for affixing
genuine marks to counterfeit products."
While section 2320 has yet to be applied to counterfeit military
goods or services, there are similar instances relevant to counterfeit
electronic parts where both contractors and subcontracts used
counterfeit parts in the manufacturing of the final product. In United
States v. Brooks,89 defendants operated a marine electrical supply
business which sold electrical parts and custom-assembled electrical
components to both civilian and military customers.90 Defendants were
charged with violating section 2320 by delivering to the U.S. Navy both
components containing trademarks of approved military suppliers which
defendants actually assembled and parts which defendant rebuilt but
represented to the client as new. 91 The Fourth Circuit rejected
defendant's argument that inclusion of defendant's interior labels on
custom-assembled components absolves them of liability for placing
counterfeit marks on the exterior of the component.92 The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that defendants' intentional use of a false mark on the customassembled electrical components that contained used parts, the use of
which was likely to cause confusion, was sufficient to hold defendants
liable for counterfeiting under section 2320.93
The reasoning provided in the Petrosian and Brooks gives helpful
insight regarding the Lanham Act application to counterfeit military
goods and services. Both cases focused on trademark infringers
intentionally using another's genuine trademark on counterfeit or
refurbished products. While those cases show that one may be held
liable for using another's registered trademark with counterfeit goods,
manufacturers in the defense supply chain are using their own genuine
trademarks on electronic parts. Section 818 attempts to address a
manufacturer's use of counterfeit components in electronic parts, 94 but
the inclusion of this provision in criminal statutes is problematic.
88. Id. (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gen. Circuit Breaker & Elec. Supply, Inc.,
106 F.3d 894, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1997); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 877 F.2d 531, 534 (7th Cir.
1989)).
89. 111 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1997).
90. Id. at 367-68. Defendants often assembled these electrical components with used
parts. Id. at 368.
91. Id. at 368.
92. Id. at 372.
93. Id.
94. See 157 CONG. REC. S7647 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2011) (statement of Sen. John
McCain) (regarding amendment 1092 to the NDAA 2012); S. COMM. ON ARMED SERV., supra
note 71, at 228-39.
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The language of section 2320(a)(3) contains two separate knowledge
requirements. One must "intentionally [traffic] in goods or services,"
and one must also "[knowL that such good or service is a counterfeit
military good or service." Unlike Petrosian and Brooks, in which
defendants knew the products they sold were counterfeit products,96
defense contractors often are unaware that counterfeit electronic parts
exist in their products. 97 Additionally, defendants may raise the Lanham
Act defense that they have received consent to use a counterfeit mark. 98
Therefore, section 2320 would not hold these parties criminally liable
for counterfeiting. Section 818 does increase requirements for defense
contractors in the testing and detecting of counterfeit electronic parts, 99
but it is nearly impossible for manufactures to ensure that every sinqle
electronic part that they produce will be free from counterfeits.
Moreover, because manufacturers often receive these counterfeit
electronic parts from foreign producers,' 0 this leads to a situation where
the United States will not be able to enforce section 2320 amendments
95.
96.
at 368.
97.

18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(3) (2012).
See United States v. Petrosian, 126 F.3d 1232, 1233 (9th Cir. 1997); Brooks, Ill F.3d
See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 27, at 5-6.

98. 15 U.S.C. § Il 15(1)(a) (2006) ("any person who shall, without the consent of the
registrant-use in commerce any ... counterfeit . . . of a registered mark in connection with the
. . . sale of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, mislead, or to deceive"). While the argument that the owner of a registered mark
gives consent to itself to use its own mark may seem obvious, it is still an available defense
since section 2320 provides that "all defenses, affirmative defenses, and limitations on remedies
that would be applicable in an action under the Lanham Act shall be applicable in a prosecution
under this section." 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d). Furthermore, the Lanham Act's definition of a
"counterfeit mark" specifically excludes
any mark or designation used on or in connection with goods or services of
which the manufacture or producer was, at the time of the manufacture or
production in question authorized to use the mark or designation for the type of
goods or services so manufactured or produced, by the holder of the right to use
such mark of designation.
15

§ U.S.C. I116(d)(1)(B).

99. NDAA 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 818(b)-(c), 125 Stat. 1298, 1493-96 (2012).
100. While section 818 places the cost of reworking and correcting counterfeit electronic
parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts on contractors, id. § 818(c)(2)(B), 125 Stat. at
1494-95, Congress has proposed an amendment to section 818 relieving defense contractors of
this cost if the defense contractor has properly implemented and complied with a counterfeit
detection and avoidance program, procured the parts from a trusted supplier, and promptly
notified the Government. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, H.R.
4310, 112th Cong. § 816 (2012). But see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013, S. 3524, 112th Cong. (2012) (removing the House amendment related to safe harboring
costs from section 818).
101.

See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 27, at 170.
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and impose increased penalties for entering counterfeit electronic parts
into the defense supply chain because of section 2320's knowledge
requirement and Lanham Act defenses.
IV. ALTERNATIVE MEANS FOR ACHIEVING NDAA 2012's
INTENDED PURPOSE

While section 2320's increased penalties do not adequately address
Congress's goal of preventing counterfeit electronic parts from entering
into the defense supply chain, there are alternative methods for
achieving this goal. While suspension or disbarment from DoD
procurement may dissuade some defense contractors from violating the
new provisions, 102 this Part will propose alternative methods for
preventing counterfeit electronic parts from entering the defense supply
chain. Specifically, this Part will focus on section 818's yet to be
codified rules regarding contractor responsibilities for counterfeit
electronic parts.10 3
Section 818's yet-to-be-promulgated measurers addressing
counterfeit electronic parts provide proactive means that the Secretary
of Defense can use to supplement the Lanham Act's shortcomings.
Section 818 requires the Secretary of Defense to promulgate new
regulations concerning the impact of counterfeit electronic parts
currently in the defense supply chain, proper training for those
throughout the defense supply chain on how to properly detect
counterfeit electronic parts, processes for responding to the detection of
counterfeit electronic parts, and remedial measures for defense
contractor's failure to comply with regulations.104 To accomplish these
goals, the regulations require defense contractors to implement
programs that enhance detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic
parts. 1o The detection programs can supplement the failures of section
102. See NDAA 2012, § 818(c)(3), 125 Stat. at 1495.
103. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
104. See NDAA 2012, § 818(c)(2)-(5), 125 Stat. at 1298.
105. Id. § 818(e), 125 Stat. at 1494-96. Covered contractors must implement policies and
procedures that
[a]ddress--(i) the training of personnel; (ii) the inspection and testing of
electronic parts; (iii) processes to abolish counterfeit parts proliferation; (iv)
mechanisms to enable traceability of parts; (v) use of trusted suppliers; (vi) the
reporting and quarantining of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect
counterfeit electronic parts; (vii) methodologies to identify suspect counterfeit
parts and to rapidly determine if a suspect counterfeit part is, in fact,
counterfeit; (viii) the design, operation, and maintenance of systems to detect
and avoid counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts;
and (ix) the flow down of counterfeit avoidance and detection requirements to
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2320 by creating alternative methods for holding defense liable in their
selection of suppliers. Additionally, these programs could help establish
a defense contractor's knowledge of using electronic parts of
substandard quality or insufficient inspection procedures in the event of
bringing sanctions.
A. Clarifyingthe "Counterfeit" Definition
For the DoD regulations to adequately satisfy Congress's intended
effect of promoting safety throughout the defense supply chain,106 the
definitions related to "counterfeit electronic part" must avoid section
2320's shortcomings. 0 7 The definitions should be consistently applied
throughout all contractor and department regulations. os The Secretary
should consider all aspects of Congress's goals and the impact that
inconsistent definitions or regulations could have on the defense
contracting industry when defining the scope of these regulations.1 09
Specifically, the definitions contained in the new regulations should
avoid reference to the Lanham Act. Reliance on Lanham Act definitions
and principles allows contractors to assert one of the Act's numerous
knowledge-related defenses, thus making it more difficult for the DoD
to hold contractors liable for the use of counterfeit electronic parts."10
This does not align with Congress's concern of ensuring quality
electronic parts are present throughout the defense supply chain."'
Instead of relying on the term "counterfeit," the regulations could
include other terms that still address the underlying quality of the
good. 112
subcontractors; and (B) establish processes for the review and approval of
contract systems ....
Id.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 60.
107. See NDAA 2012, § 818(b)(1), 125 Stat. at 1493-94. The definitions will also include
"previously used parts represented as new." Id.
108. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
109.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, H.R. REP. No. 112-

479, at 186 (2012) (suggesting "continuing communication between industry and policy makers
to be instrumental to effecting sound policies and policies . . . in mitigating the treatment of
counterfeit electronic parts").
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d) (2012).
111. See supra text accompanying note 55, 60.
112. Other regulations in the Defense Acquisition Regulations System use terms other than
"counterfeit" that address the underlying quality of a contractor's product See, e.g, Federal
Acquisition Regulations System, 48 C.F.R. § 252.244-7001(a) (2011) (using the term
"significant deficiency" to define a shortcoming in a contractor purchasing system); id. §
253.209-1(a)(i)(C) (requiring review of contractor's "quality assurance" capabilities); id. §
252.246-7003(a) (using "critical safety item" to apply to all aspects of a contractor system
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The Defense Secretary should ensure that these inspection and
testing regulations broadly apply to all aspects underlying the quality of
the electronic parts. For example, Congress specifically identified the
operating conditions and longevity of electronic parts as particular areas
of concern which could easily be overlooked if not properly addressed
by DoD.11 3 The current "counterfeit" definitions promulgated since
Congress passed section 818 address items that do not meet military
specifications 1 l 4 and items that are unauthorized copies or substitutes
that have been illegally altered and misrepresented as produced by the
legally authorized source. 1 To adequately address Congress's concerns
of electronic parts performing under adequate conditions and for
specified periods of time, DoD regulations related to testing should
include these factors in any future definition related to the quality of the
electronic part.1 16 Also, development of proper testing requirements will
require cooperation between DoD and defense contractors to ensure that
specifications for each electronic part are defined ahead of time.1 17
Cooperation will prevent substandard parts from entering the defense
supply before they can cause harm and relieve DoD from relying on
inadequate criminal remedies under section 2320.
In addition to the testing and inspection requirements, the DoD's
focus on "critical items" in its internal guidance for implementing
counterfeit prevention measures raises a question whether the
regulations will require contractors to notify the DoD of only a subset of
electronic parts that would exclude other electronic parts whose
substandard quality would still impact safety of products in the defense
supply chain." 8 Instead, contractor notification requirements should

which could have a safety impact). In fact, the section 818 requires that the "processes for the
review and approval of contractor systems for the detection and avoidance of counterfeit and
suspect counterfeit electronic parts" should be comparable to the processes established for
contractor business systems, as described above in part 252.244-7001(a). NDAA 2012, §
818(e)(2)(B), 125 Stat. at 1496.
113.

15, at 6.
114.
115.
(defining
116.

S. COMM. ON ARMED SERV., supra note 71, at 36-37; see also Metzger, supra note

18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(4)(A) (defining "counterfeit military good or service").
Kendall, Overarching DoD Counterfeit Prevention Guidance, supra note 12, at 1
"counterfeit material").
The DoD has already implied that these considerations may not be addressed in the

detection and inspection regulations. See PAUL D. PETERS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ANTICOUNTERFEIT PRODUCT SUPPORT MANAGERS CONFERENCE 8 (June 6, 2012) (stating that

inspections will require electronic parts to perform according to all required specifications, but
omitting longevity of performance and performance under strenuous conditions as inspection
requirements when other specific inspection and test processes are listed).
117. Metzger, supra note 15, at 8.
118. Kendall, Overarching DoD Counterfeit Prevention Guidance, supra note 12, at 1; see
also Metzger, supra note 15, at 3.
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parallel the testing and detection requirements for electronic parts."l 9
Broader application of the notification requirement will avoid confusion
and inconsistent application of the regulations and help improve the
safety of products in the defense supply chain.120
The Secretary of Defense can look to other industry standards, such
as those provided by SAE as guidance in its rule promulgation.121
Additionally, the Secretary could look to alternative definitions
contained in the Defense Acquisition Regulation System to avoid the
"counterfeit" confusion altogether.122 Congress and the defense
contracting industry have similar goals in improving the quality of their
products by eliminating counterfeit electronic parts, so SAE standards
would be helpful in defining terms and regulations that are consistent
with Congress's intent in passing the NDAA 2012. Failure to create
consistent definitions will lead to ambiguous interpretations and
differing applications, as has been seen throughout various federal
courts of a peall 23 and suggested in commentary analyzing

section 818.12

119. Metzger suggests that Kendall's memorandum addresses the detection and inspection
of more than just electronic parts. Meztger, supra note 15, at 2. While discussion of nonelectronic parts is beyond the scope of this Note, the DoD should consider the implications that
the section 818 regulations would have on other existing or future detection and testing
requirements. See DEP'T OF DEF., OPEN FAR CASES 2 (Oct. 26, 2012), available at

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/opencases/farcasenum/far.pdf (suggesting that portions of
section 818 will be applied to Federal Acquisition Regulations, not just the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulations, and using the term "non-conforming supplies" rather than
"counterfeits" in case number 2013-002).
120. The memorandum indirectly refers to "critical safety items" as defined in part
252.246-7003(a) in relation to contractor purchasing systems. Kendall, Overarching DoD
Counterfeit Prevention Guidance, supra note 12, at 2. The term "critical safety item" would
seem to encompass all electronic parts which could have a safety impact, see 48 C.F.R. §
252.246-7003(a), but the terms should be used consistently to avoid confusion.
121.

See generally SAE AEROSPACE, SAE INT'L, supra note 33, at 5. See also Metzger,

supra note 15, at 3 (noting the Senate's favorable treatment of SAE AS5553-2009); CRAIG
HOLMAN ET AL., FEATURE COMMENT: PREPARING FOR NEw RULES TO COMBAT COUNTERFEIT

PARTS, 54 No. 23 Gov't Contractor T 189 (suggesting that contractors who do not have an
existing counterfeit mitigation plan should adopt existing roadmaps, such as the SAE Aerospace
guidelines, to prevent counterfeits from entering the defense supply chain).
122. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
123. Compare United States v. Petrosian, 126 F.3d 1232, 1234 (9th Cir. 1997) (indicating
that the "counterfeit" definition in section 2320 is identical to that application in the Lanham
Act), with United States v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the 9th Circuit's
indication from Petrosianbecause of the criminal and civil distinction between section 2320 and
the Lanham Act) (citing United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000)).
124. See Metzger, supra note 15, at 2.
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B. Alternative Sources ofLiability
Despite section 2320's shortcomings in relying upon trademark
principles to create criminal liability for defense contractors who allow
counterfeit electronic parts to enter the defense supply chain, the yet-tobe promulgated contractor responsibilities1 25 may allow DoD to hold
contractors liable based on other fraud-based statutes. For example, the
United States can charge defense contractors with violating the Federal
False Claims Act 26 (FCA) for knowingly 27 submitting false or
fraudulent claimsl 28 to the United States for payment or approval. Since
the FCA is a civil statute, the United States may be more successful in
bringing actions under the FCA rather than section 2320 while still
adhering to Congress's goals of increased penalties for use of
counterfeit electronic parts.
A defense contractor violates the FCA if it withholds information
about its noncompliance with material 29 contractual requirements.130
125.
126.
127.

See NDAA 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
31 U.S.C. §§ 3279-3733 (2012).

§ 818(e)(2)(A), 125 Stat. 1298, 1496 (2012).

The terms "knowing" and "knowingly" - mean that a person, with respect to
information - has actual knowledge of the information; acts in deliberate
ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or acts in reckless disregard
of the truth or falsity of the information; and require no proof of specific intent
to defraud.
Id. § 3729(b)(1).
128.
The term "claim" means any request or demand, whether under contract or
otherwise, for money or property and whether or not the United States has title
to the money or property, that - is presented to an officer, employee, or agent
of the United States; or is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if
the money or property is to be spent or used on the Government's behalf or to
advance a Government program or interest, and if the United States
Government - provides or has provided any portion of the money or property
requested or demanded; or will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other
recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or
demanded.
Id. § 3729(b)(2)(A). "The term 'claim' . . . does not include requests or demands for money or
property that the Government has paid to an individual as compensation for Federal
employment or as an income subsidy with no restrictions on that individual's use of the money
or property." Id. § 3729(b)(2)(B).
129. "The term 'material' means having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of
influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property." Id § 3729(b)(4). "The existence of
express contractual language specifically linking compliance to eligibility for payment may well
constitute dispositive evidence of materiality, but it is not . . . a necessary condition." United
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While the federal circuits disagree as to whether such false certifications
require a condition precedent,' 31 the DoD can avoid this problem by
clearly drafting the new regulations required by section 818. Those
regulations should require all contractual arrangements between the
United States and defense contractors to contain a provision that
expressly requires defenses contractors, as a condition of payment on
each submission to United States, to certify that it complied with all
inspection and testing requirements under the new section 818
regulations.
Unlike section 2320, a defense contractor is not required to have
specific intent to violate the FCA.1 32 Rather, in establishing knowledge
under the FCA based on the theory of implied certification, "the FCA
requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knows (1) that it
violated a contractual obligation, and (2) that its compliance with the
obligation was material to the government's decision to pay." 33 in
assessing whether government contractors violated the FCA by
submitting claims to the United States for payment related to products
of substandard quality, courts will examine whether the contractor was
aware, or should have been aware, that the product was not what the
contractor purported it to be.' 3 4 Additionally, defense contractors will
not be able to assert Lanham Act defenses which are available under

section 2320.135
Most uniquely, the FCA undermines a contractor's attempts to
conceal its noncompliance with onerous testing and inspection
procedures by encouraging private individuals to report fraud by
defense contractors.136 If a whistleblower brings a successful action
States v. Sci. Applications Intern. Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Materiality may
also be established through "testimony demonstrating that parties to the contract understood that
the payment was conditional on compliance with the requirement at issue." Id.
130. Sci. Applications Intern. Corp., 626 F.3d at 1269. Often, contractual requirements
may require the contractor to expressly certify that the contractor inspected and tested the
quality of the goods before submitting the goods to the United States. See, e.g., United States v.
Advance Tool Co., 902 F. Supp. 1011, 1016 (W.D. Mo 1995), affd, 86 F.3d 1159 (8th Cir.
1996) (requiring contractor to perform all inspections and tests necessary to determine that the
goods conformed to contract specifications).
131. CompareSci. Applications Intern. Corp., 626 F.3d at 1269-70 (allowing the United
States to recover for a violation of a condition that was not an express prerequisite to payment),
with Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697-700 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing the United States to
recover, absent express contractual terms, only when the underlying statute or regulation upon
the plaintiff relies expressly states that the defendant must comply in order to be paid).
132. Advance Tool Co., 902 F. Supp. at 1016.
133. Sci. Applications Intern. Corp., 626 F.3d at 1271.
134. Crane Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 410, 435-36 (1999).
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d) (2012) (allowing defendant to assert any defenses available
under the Lanham Act when charged with violations of section 2320).
136. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012) ("A person may bring a civil action for a violation of
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under the FCA, the whistleblower receives an award equal to a
percentage of the funds recovered by the United States in the action.' 37
Since the FCA increases the likelihood that the United States will
discover a contractor's noncompliance with section 818's testing and
inspection requirements, the FCA complements Congress's goal of
preventing counterfeit electronic parts from entering the defense supply
chain.
Because the forthcoming regulations described in section 818 will
require defense contractors to inspect and test electronic parts, the FCA
may allow the United States to recover considerable funds if contractors
fail to comply with these new regulations.' 38 FCA violators are liable to
the United States for 3 times the amount of damages which the United
States sustains because of defendant's false claims,13 9 a civil penalty of
$5,000 to $10 000 for each false claim that defendant submits to the
government, 14d and reasonable expenses, attorneys' fees, and costs.141
While on its face the recovery available to the United States under the
FCA may not seem as substantial as the criminal penalties under section
2320,142 damages and civil penalties under the FCA are easier to

obtain.143
Compared to section 2320, the FCA serves as a better avenue to
section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government").
137. Id. § 3730(d) (awarding the whistleblower, depending on the circumstances
articulated in subsection 3730(d), anywhere between 15% and 30% of the proceeds of the action
or settlement of the claim).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Advance Tool Co., 902 F. Supp. 1011, 1016 (W.D. Mo
1995) (finding defendant knowingly submitted false claims within the meaning of the FCA
because defendant was required under contract to inspect and test the products to determine that
the products conformed with the contract requirements).
139. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). Specifically, actual damages under the FCA are equal to the
market value of the products the government sought under the contract minus the market value
of the products the government received and retained from the defendant. United States v.
Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 316 n.13 (1976).
140. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). See also, e.g., United States v. Rule Indus., Inc., 878 F.2d 535,
538 (1st Cir. 1989) (assessing a total of 302 civil penalties for defendant's false claim on each of
the 302 invoices which defendant submitted to the government for payment during a two year
period). Additionally, civil penalties are recoverable under the FCA even if the United States
fails to show actual damages; see United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency,
929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153
n.5 (1956)).
141. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(l)-(2) (awarding successful qui tam plaintiffs "reasonable
expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs").
142. First time violations for knowingly trafficking in counterfeit military goods or
services can result in fines up to $5,000,000 for individuals and $15,000,000 for organizations.
18 U.S.C. § 2320(b)(3)(A) (2012). Second or subsequent violations can result in fines up to
$15,000,000 for individuals and $30,000,000 for organizations. Id. § 2320(b)(3)(B).
143. See supranotes 130-38 and accompanying text.
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achievin Congress's ultimate goal in passing the NDAA 2012:
safety.14 If section 818 regulations will require that defense contractors
certify their compliance with their testing and inspection
responsibilities, the United States may be able to bring FCA actions
against defense contractors. This would encourage defense contractors
to comply with the NDAA's testing and inspection provisions, reducing
the chance that counterfeit electronic parts enter the defense supply
chain in the first place. Without the certification requirement and
potential FCA liability, contractors would have no incentive for
notifying the government that the contractor, upon later discovery,
unknowingly submitted counterfeit electronic parts to the defense
supply chain. Additionally, the FCA's encouragement of whistleblower
participation in bringing actions against defense contractors addresses
other goals sought by the NDAA, such as aiding DoD investigations of
suspected counterfeit electronic parts by providing first-hand
information of potential violations.' 4 Conversely, defense contractors
can only be held criminally liable under section 2320 if they
intentionally supply the government with military goods or services
which the contractor knows are counterfeit military goods or services.14 6
The Defense Secretary should carefully consider these alternatives
when promulgating the section 818 rules.
V. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the problem with this definition is likely to continue
due to the NDAA 2012's use of the word "counterfeit" in describing the
"electronic parts" with which Congress was concerned in preventing
from entering the defense supply chain. 147 As evidenced by the use of
the term "counterfeit," congressional members have assumed that
reliance on the Lanham Act's trademark principles is the best method
for preventing these counterfeit electronic parts from entering the
defense supply chain.148 But because Congress is more concerned with
the quality of the underlying good, alternatives to relying on trademark
144. See supra notes 55, 60 and accompanying text.
145. See Metzger, supra note 15, at 4.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(3).
147. See NDAA 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 818, 125 Stat. 1298 (2012) (titled "Detection
and Avoidance of Counterfeit Electronic Parts").
148. Although no congressional support for section 818 of the NDAA 2012 includes use of
the terms "Lanham Act" or "Trademark," Congress's reliance on the Lanham Act is evidenced
by such use in the bill itself. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d) (allowing Lanham Act defenses). The
Department of Commerce assessment of counterfeit electronic parts in the defense supply chain
also uses the term "counterfeit" throughout its analysis. See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S.
DEP'TOF COMMERCE, supra note 27, at 192.
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and counterfeit principles would better serve Congress's goal of
ensurin the quality of electronic parts throughout the defense supply
chain.'

149. Section 2320's definition of "counterfeit military good or service" further evidences
Congress's concern with the underlying quality of the good by specifically identifying goods or
services that fail to meet military specifications. 18 § U.S.C. 2320(e)(4).

